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COMPENSATED SITING PROPOSALS: IS IT
TIME TO PAY ATTENTION?
Vicki Beent
Many proposals to overcome the difficulty of siting locally unde-
sirable land uses ("LULUs") fairly and efficiently suggest that the
problem could be resolved if victims of the siting were adequately
compensated for the burdens the LULU imposes.1 Neither envi-
ronmental justice advocates nor academics focusing on environ-
mental justice issues have thoroughly studied compensation
proposals.2 Some advocates dismiss the proposals out-of-hand as
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Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at the New York Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION
67-87 (1983); Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition
to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
265, 275-76 (1982); Alan L. Farkas, Overcoming Public Opposition to the Establish-
ment of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 9 CAP. U. L. REV. 451, 458-59 (1980);
Bernard Holznagel, Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 329, 355 (1986); Roger E. Kasper-
son et al., Confronting Equity in Radioactive Waste Management: Modest Proposals
for a Socially Just and Acceptable Program, in EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT 331, 348-49 (Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983); Paul R.
Kleindorfer, Compensation and Negotiation in the Siting of Hazardous-Waste Facili-
ties, 51 Sci. TOTAL ENV'T 197, 198 (1986); Howard Kunreuther et al., A Compensation
Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities: Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 371 (1987); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon
and Siting and Cleaning Up of Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or
Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. Ars. L. REV. 239, 241 (1991); Michael
O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't" Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of
Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407, 428-30 (1977) [hereinafter O'Hare, Not on My
Block]; Arthur M. Sullivan, Siting Noxious Facilities: A Siting Lottery with Victim
Compensation, 31 J. URB. ECON. 360 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Siting Noxious Fa-
cilities]; Arthur M. Sullivan, Victim Compensation Revisited: Efficiency Versus Equity
in the Siting of Noxious Facilities, 41 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (1990) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Victim Compensation]; see generally Daniel Mazmanian & David Morell, The
"NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 125, 137-38 (Norman J.
Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
2. Exceptions include MARY R. ENGLISH, SITING Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES: THE PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA 98 (1992); Vicki Been,
What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1040-46 (1993) [hereinafter Been,
What's Fairness Got To Do With It?]; Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the
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immoral.' Others summarily conclude that compensation pro-
grams are bound to fail because "safety is not usually a negotiable
issue."'4 Some have simply ignored the proposals because they be-
lieve that addressing them would undermine the environmental
justice movement's goal of pollution prevention.
This Article seeks to spur greater attention to the difficult moral
and political issues compensation proposals raise by showing that
compensation programs are widespread in actual siting practice. It
argues that the success of compensation programs, while limited,
has been sufficient to ensure that such proposals will continue to be
a significant feature of siting programs. It urges those interested in
environmental justice to devote greater attention to compensation
proposals, and to begin either to articulate an intellectually rigor-
ous critique of the proposals or to develop a strategy for shaping a
compensation practice that is beneficial to the movement's
constituency.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the basic theory of the com-
pensation proposals, and provides a simple typology of the various
proposals. Part II examines results of surveys that provide some
theoretical evidence regarding whether compensation is likely to
succeed in persuading communities to accept LULUs. Part III
analyzes siting programs that have attempted to use compensation
to induce communities to accept various kinds of LULUs. It de-
scribes each program and assesses the programs' failures and suc-
cesses. Finally, Part IV offers an agenda for study of the moral and
practical implications of compensation proposals.
I. Compensated Siting Proposals
A. The Theories Underlying Compensation Proposals
The siting of LULUs-which include public "improvements"
such as highways and airports, social service facilities such as
Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilites: A Comprehensive Approach to a
Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994); see also Vicki Been, Neighbors
Without Redress: Inconsistencies in the Theory of Compensated Siting of Loccally
Undesirable Land Uses (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
[hereinafter Been, Neighbors Without Redress] (arguing that compensation programs
may underprotect the immediate neighbors of a LULU because acceptance of the
compensation is often based upon consent of the majority of the political jurisdiction,
rather than the majority of those most seriously burdened by the LULU).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 91 (1990) (questioning the morality of "pay[ing] those who are
less fortunate to accept risks that others can afford to escape").
4. Mank, supra note 1, at 275; see also Gerrard, supra note 2.
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homeless shelters and group homes, and waste facilities ranging
from municipal landfills to high level nuclear waste storage facili-
ties-has become an extraordinarily difficult public policy chal-
lenge.' Siting controversies have erupted in community after
community, sometimes violently.6 Industries and social service
agencies claim that problems in siting facilities have made it in-
creasingly difficult to manufacture their products or to deliver their
services.7 Dissatisfaction over the disparate abilities of communi-
ties to block the siting of LULUs has contributed to the rise of the
environmental justice movement.8 In short, siting has become a
major source of frustration for government, industry, and social
service agencies on the one hand, and for the communities targeted
for facilities on the other.
A primary, although by no means the only, explanation for the
vehemence with which communities protest proposed sites is that
the benefits of LULUs are spread diffusely over an entire commu-
nity, region, state, or nation,9 while their costs10 are concentrated
5. Gerrard, supra note 2; Mank, supra note 1, at 272.
6. For reports of violence arising from siting controversies, see Gerrard, supra
note 2 (surveying literature); Herbert Inhaber, Of LULUs, NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs,
107 PUB. INTEREST 52 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Lack of LLW Disposal Could Trigger Cutbacks in Health Care, Re-
search, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Nov. 4, 1993, at 121; Paul Hoversten, Wanted: Per-
manent Home for Nuclear Wastes, USA TODAY, May 11, 1993, at 12A. The difficulty
of siting new facilities also is alleged to increase illegal disposal of hazardous waste
and illegal trade in waste with third world countries. See, e.g., Kleindorfer, supra note
1, at 201. For a critical analysis of that claim, see Gerrard, supra note 2.
8. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
69, 71-74 (1991).
9. Some LULUs do benefit the host community. For example, a host community
may see an influx of new jobs, increased tax revenues, and an increase in local
purchases. These benefits, however, often are insufficient to outweigh the costs that
the LULU imposes locally. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 275; Gail Bingham &
Daniel S. Miller, Prospects for Resolving Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through
Negotiation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 473, 474, 478 (1984); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting
New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of
the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429, 433 (1984).
10. The costs depend upon the nature of the LULU. Noxious LULUs such as
hazardous waste dumps, nuclear power plants, and polluting factories may pose
health risks to those living nearby, and may decrease neighboring property values,
increase noise, odors, pollution and congestion, and stigmatize the community.
MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 17-117 (1988); Bacow &
Milkey, supra note 1, at 268; James M. Melius et al., Facility Siting and Health Ques-
tions: The Burden of Health Risk Uncertainty, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 467 (1984);
David Morell, Siting and the Politics of Equity, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT
117, 120-21 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987). Neighbors fear that social service LULUs
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upon the host neighborhood.11  Industry associations, 12 academ-
ics, 13 and public policy makers' 4 have responded with a seemingly
simple solution: compensate host communities for the harms the
LULU causes.' 5  Proponents advance several justifications for
compensation programs. First, they argue that if a LULU's bene-
fits to the community outweigh its costs, the community will have
no reason to oppose the project, and indeed may welcome it.16
may decrease neighboring property values, pose risks to neighbors' personal safety,
cause current residents to leave, and threaten the neighborhood's character and qual-
ity of life. MICHAEL J. DEAR & S. MARTIN TAYLOR, NOT ON OUR STREET 22 (1982);
Richard Balukas & Joan Wald Baken, Community Resistance to Development. of
Group Homes for People with Mental Retardation, 46 REHABILITATION LITERATURE
194, 196 (1985); Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syn-
drome, 58 AM. PLAN. Ass'N J. 288, 290-91 (1992); Paul Maxim & Darryl Plecas, Pris-
ons and Their Perceived Impact on the Local Community: A Case Study, 13 Soc.
INDICATORS RES. 39, 49 (1983); Phyllis Solomon, Analyzing Opposition to Commu-
nity Residental Facilities for Troubled Adolescents, 62 CHILD WELFARE 361, 363
(1983); Donald E. Weber, Neighborhood Entry in Group Home Development, 57
CHILD WELFARE 627, 634 (1978).
11. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 268-69; Holznagel, supra note 1, at 355;
Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AM. ECON. Ass'N PAPERS & PROC. 285, 287 (1986);
Kunreuther et al., supra note 1, at 372; Sullivan, Victim Compensation, supra note 1, at
211.
12. See, e.g., Nat'l Solid Waste Management Ass'n, NSWMA Position Statement
on Siting of Waste Management Facilities (Nov. 1979).
13. See sources cited supra note 1.
14. Many consultants to state and federal governments have recommended com-
pensation programs to ease the difficulty of siting LULUs. See, e.g., ERM-NEw ENG-
LAND, INC. & ERM-NORTHEAST, FINAL REPORT: ASSISTANCE TO LOCALITIES
AFFECTED BY HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES (1988) (report prepared for New York
State Dep't of Environmental Conservation); see also Farkas, supra note 1, at 459
(citing several reports from consultants suggesting compensation programs to state
and federal agencies). Some governmental associations also have endorsed the con-
cept of compensation. See, e.g., Nat'l Governors' Ass'n, Policy D-17, Hazardous
Waste Management § 17.5.3 (1991-92) ("As a critical element of siting laws and prac-
tice, states should legitimize and encourage compensation and mitigation.").
15. Compensation in this sense is analogous to development exactions, which are
sometimes used to counter or "buy off" opposition to a particular development pro-
ject. Elizabeth Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, 10 N.Y. AFF. 96, 100-01 (1988).
16. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 275; Bingham & Miller, supra note 9, at 478-
79; Morell, supra note 10, at 120-21;.Anthony J. Mumphrey & Julian Wolpert, Equity
Considerations and Concessions in the Siting of Public Facilities, 49 ECON, GEOGRA-
PHY 109 (1973); Kent E. Portney, The Role of Economic Factors in Lay Perceptions of
Risk, in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 53, 54 (Charles E. Davis &
James P. Lester eds., 1988); Ronald Pushchak & Ian Burton, Risk and Prior Compen-
sation in Siting Low-Level Nuclear Waste Facilities: Dealing with the NIMBY Syn-
drome, 23 PLAN CANADA 68, 71-72 (1983).
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Next, proponents justify compensation programs as an equitable
solution to the siting problem.'7 Many people recognize that im-
posing the costs of a particular LULU upon one community, while
the benefits of the LULU are spread over a much larger number of
people, is unjust. Compensation schemes are advanced to redress
that injustice in situations where it would be impractical to equita-
bly distribute risks physically or spatially.'8 It may be unwise, for
example, to site a radioactive or hazardous waste facility in every
community that produces such waste, because a few large central-
ized facilities generally are considered safer, more environmentally
sound, and more efficient than many small facilities.' 9 Those com-
munities that must serve as host to the larger centralized facilites
should be compensated, however, for bearing the burden by those
who enjoy the benefits.20
A third major justification for compensation proposals is that
compensation can help to make siting decisions more efficient.
Compensation forces the facility's developer to internalize the
costs of the facility, and therefore helps to ensure that only those
facilities that are efficient will be built.2 ' In addition, liability for
the costs of the facility gives the facility's developer a strong incen-
tive to take precautions to avoid or reduce those costs. 22 More-
over, a community's participation in negotiations over the facility
may make the public more willing to accept the risks associated
with its operation. 3 Studies show that risks a community assumes
voluntarily are more likely to be accepted than those foisted upon
a community.24
17. See, e.g., O'HARE ET AL, supra note 1, at 70, 76-81; Farkas, supra note 1, at
458; Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 346-52.
18. For discussion of how compensation may be seen as a means of achieving a
fair distribution of the burdens of LULUs, see Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With
It, supra note 2, at 1028-31, 1040-46.
19. For discussion of the problem of physically sharing the risks of wastes, see THE
NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME 173-74 (Audrey Armour ed., 1984); Kasperson et
al., supra note 1, at 349-52.
20. THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 19, at 173-74; Farkas,
supra note 1, at 458; Mitchell & Carson, supra note 11, at 289.
21. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 1, at 70, 86; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 275-
76 & n. 63; Bingham & Miller, supra note 9, at 479; Kleindorfer, supra note 1, at 205.
22. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 1, at 85-86; Kerry E. Rodgers, Negotiated Com-
pensation and Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Ten Years in Massachusetts 10-11
(1990) (unpublished paper on file with author).
23. See THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 19, at 154 (statement
of Chris Haussmann); ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 135-36.
24. THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 19, at 181; Richard J.
Bord, Problems in Siting Low Level Radioactive Wastes: A Focus on Public Participa-
tion in MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACrIVE MATERIALS AND WASTES: ISSUES AND PRO-
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B. Differences in Compensation Proposals
While the basic theoretical justifications for compensation tend
to be relatively constant among proponents, the details of the pro-
posals vary in several significant ways. This section offers a rough
typology of the different types of proposals.25
1. Remedial Nature of the Compensation
Compensation may serve as a remedy, a preventative measure,
or a reward. 26 As a remedy, compensation seeks to make a com-
munity whole for damages it will suffer as a result of the facility.27
Agreements to pay neighboring property owners for any decrease
in the market value of their homes caused by the facility are an
example of remedial compensation.28 Alternatively, compensation
may seek to prevent or reduce the harm the facility will cause.29
Such compensation measures are often referred to as "mitigation."
The provision of buffer zones between a facility and its residential
neighbors is an example of mitigation. Finally, compensation may
serve to reward the community for accepting the facility by provid-
ing funds or benefits in excess of those required to remedy any
harms caused by the facility.3 ° Such measures are sometimes called
"incentives" rather than compensation.
2. Method of Compensation Proposed
Compensation either may be ex ante (before the facility is con-
structed or causes any harm to the community), on-going, or ex
GRESS 189, 191 (Shyamal K. Majumdar & E. Willard Miller eds., 1985); Charles Davis,
Public Involvment in Hazardous Waste Siting Decisions, 19 Polity 296, 297 (1986);
Baruch Fischoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes
Toward Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Policy Sciences 127 (1978).
25. In addition to the differences discussed in the text, compensation programs
and proposals differ regarding the source of the compensation. Most programs now
in effect require the facility developer to provide the compensation, but many aca-
demic proposals explore schemes in which the compensation is financed through
taxes on residents of nonhost communities or other forms of taxation. See, e.g., Sulli-
van, Victim Compensation, supra note 1, at 217-23.
26. DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITIES LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 164-75 (1982); Ger-
rard, supra note 2.
27. Gerrard, supra note 2.
28. Remedial compensation often takes the form of monetary payments, but can
also take the form of in-kind compensation. If a facility takes land the community
had used for recreational purposes, for example, the developer may compensate for
the loss by providing other land. Holznagel, supra note 1, at 356.
29. Gerrard, supra note 2.
30. Id.
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post (after the facility causes some harm). 31 Ex ante compensation
often takes the form of grants, which allow the host community to
hire its own experts to evaluate the proposed facility.32 Ex ante
compensation also may involve community participation in the de-
sign of the facility, selection of alternative facility operating proce-
dures, or selection of the facility operator.33 Finally, ex ante
compensation may consist of "risk substitution" rather than
money, amenities, or rights of participation. Several academics
have proposed, for example, that developers of waste disposal fa-
cilities offer to clean up all or some of a community's existing toxic
waste sites in exchange for approval of the new facility.34
On-going compensation often takes the form of special taxes or
fees the facility regularly pays to the community, or services the
facility regularly provides the community. 35 In addition, on-going
benefits may include mitigation measures to reduce the negative
impacts that the facility or its construction will have on the commu-
nity,36 to minimize the dangers the facility poses,3' or to improve
response to any dangerous conditions that develop. 3  On-going
benefits may also include boosts to the local economy, such as jobs
for local residents, purchases from local businesses, or contribu-
tions to local charities.39
31. Kleindorfer, supra note 1, at 198; Kunreuther et al., supra note 1, at 381.
32. These forms of compensation most often are provided by the facility's devel-
oper. The county, state, or federal government also can provide such grants to the
proposed host community. Celeste P. Duffy, State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting:
Easing the Process Through Local Cooperation and Preemption, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 755, 787 (1984).
33. Bord, supra note 25, at 197-98; Duffy, supra note 32, at 784.
34. KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES:
THE NIMBY SYNDROME 137-59 (1991); Mank, supra note 1, at 273, 282.
35. Duffy, supra note 32, at 785; Sullivan, Victim Compensation, supra note 1, at
223 (facilities provide such services as free pesticide disposal for local farmers and
free snow plowing to the host city).
36. ERM-NEw ENGLAND, INC. & ERM-NoRTHEAST, supra note 14, at 7-11;
Duffy, supra note 32, at 784 n. 213; Patrick G. Marshall, Not In My Back Yard!, EDI-
TORIAL RES. REP., June 9, 1989, at 306, 315.
37. The developer can agree to install monitoring equipment or leakage barriers
beyond that required by law, for example. Mank, supra note 1, at 276.
38. For example, the developer may provide buffer zones around the facility to
help counter any fires, explosions, or leaks. In addition, the developer could donate
emergency equipment, or improve the roads or bridges that emergency equipment
would have to use in the event of an accident. MICHAEL R. GREENBERG & RICHARD
F. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILTY GAP 260-61 (1984);
Mank, supra note 1, at 276.
39. Duffy, supra note 32, at 786-87; Robin Gregory et al., Incentives Policies to Site
Hazardous Facilities, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 667 (1991); Mank, supra note 1, at 276.
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In addition, on-going benefits may take the form of continuing
opportunities for community participation in the management of
the facility. Local community representatives may be guaranteed a
role in site monitoring, or be allowed to have an independent third
party serve as a monitor, or be given funds to buy monitoring
equipment, for example.1° Moreover, the community may be given
some role in decisions about whether to close a facility down in the
event of an emergency, or about other emergency response ques-
tions.41 Finally, the community may be given representation on the
facility's governing board.42
Ex post compensation may include commitments to pay for, or
insure against, future damages. Such commitments take the form
of property value guarantees,43 local product price guarantees,
agreements to indemnify local governments, or funds to compen-
sate victims in the event of an accident. 44
3. Determining the Compensation Package
Compensation proposals also differ in how the terms of the com-
pensation package are determined. One approach is for the gov-
erning statute to establish the level of compensation applicable to
all communities. 45 Alternatively, the statute can authorize a regu-
latory agency to determine the compensation package on a case by
case basis.46 Another technique is to allow the facility developer
40. Bord, supra note 24, at 197; Duffy, supra note 32, at 785.
41. THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 19, at 178.
42. Id. at 173-74.
43. See, e.g., LeAnn Spencer, Dump Owner to Guarantee Home Values, CHICAGO
TRIB., May 21, 1993, § Lake, at 1.
44. ERM-NEw ENGLAND, INC. & ERM-NORTHEAST, supra note 14, at 12-14;
Bord, supra note 24, at 195-96. Similarly, state and federal governments can ensure
ex post compensation through special laws or procedures giving any member of the
host community harmed by the facility legal redress against the facility's developer.
Duffy, supra note 32, at 787-88; see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-7 (1989) (estab-
lishing a cause of action against the facility operator for "devaluation of" or "inter-
fere[nce] with" property rights).
45. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-6-6.6-2 & 6-6-6.6-3 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993)
(commercial hazardous waste facilities taxed at a rate of $11.50 per ton, 25% of which
goes to the host county); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68.178(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1992) (county may levy up to 5% of gross receipts of hazardous waste facility);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1319-R(4) (West Supp. 1993) (host municipality may
levy up to 2% of a commercial hazardous waste facility's annual billings).
46. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-11 (West 1990) (administrative body may
assess fee to hazardous waste facility if it determines that facility creates a need to
educate and train local officials and employees regarding emergency response meas-
ures); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-80 (West Supp. 1993) (host municipality may levy up
to 5% of receipts of hazardous waste facility, but amount may be increased or de-
creased by administrative agency); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-152.1 (1991) (host county
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and the community to negotiate a mutually satisfactory package.47
A fourth approach is to auction the facility to the community will-
ing to accept the least compensation.4 8 Herbert Inhaber has pro-
posed a "reverse auction" system for siting LULUs. Under his
scheme, the siting authority announces the facility it wishes to site,
the environmental and safety criteria it will use to determine ap-
propriate sites, and its initial bid for the site. Any community that
believes it has an appropriate site and wishes to accept the siting
authority's bid may offer the site for consideration. If no commu-
nity steps forward, the siting authority raises its bid. The siting au-
thority continues to raise its bid until the facility would no longer
be cost-effective or until a community steps forward, whichever
comes first. If a community accepts the bid, some percentage of
the compensation is transferred to a trust fund for the community,
where it is held until the profferred site is approved on environ-
mental and safety grounds. If the site is disapproved, the money is
returned and the auction continues.49
Finally, a fifth method of determining compensation is through
the use of a lottery.50 Under a lottery scheme, the siting govern-
ment asks all citizens in a region to be subject to the results of a
lottery to pick the site for the facility, with the understanding that
those who live in the areas spared the facility will be taxed to com-
pensate those who live in the host community.5 . The compensation
to be paid is the amount that the government must promise its vot-
ers in order to secure unanimous consent for the lottery. 2
may levy tax on hazardous waste facility to compensate for additional costs it incurs
as a result of facility, but facility may appeal to administrative body and to courts);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-211.1 (1987) (host city may levy tax on hazardous waste
facility to compensate for additional costs it incurs as a result of facility, but facility
may appeal to administrative body and to courts).
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22A-128 (West 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 299.520(6) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.191(5) (West Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-8 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1442 (Michie 1989);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(8) (West 1989).
48. See, e.g., Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution to the Problem of Nuclear
and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 808 (1991); Kunreuther
et al., supra note 1, at 375; Howard Kunreuther & Paul R. Kleindorfer, A Sealed-Bid
Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 295 (1986);
O'Hare, Not on My Block, supra note 1, at 438-39.
49. Inhaber, supra note 6, at 60-62; Inhaber, supra note 48, at 811-13.
50. Sullivan, Siting Noxious Facilities, supra note 1, at 360-61.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 363-66. Sullivan offers an economic model to show that the compensa-
tion necessary to secure unanimous consent to the lottery will be lower than the com-
pensation required to site facilities through negotiation. Id.
19941 795
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4. Triggering a Community's Involvement
Most compensation proposals allow communities to step forward
and reveal their interest in exploring the possibility of hosting a
facility. 3 Some proposals and programs, however, allow facility
developers to select the community in which they would like to
locate the facility, and to initiate discussions with that
community. 4
5. Ensuring Efficiency
Finally, the proposals differ in the mechanisms they use to en-
sure that negotiations produce an efficient level of compensation.5
If all communities are fully informed about the costs of a facility,
and all enjoy equal bargaining power, a siting will be most efficient
if the facility is placed in the community that is willing to accept the
facility for the lowest price (assuming that the price covers all the
costs the facility imposes).5 6 To promote such efficiency, some pro-
posals attempt to create a competitive market for agreements be-
tween facility developers and communities. 7
II. Theoretical Tests Of The Proposals
Several scholars have attempted to test the likelihood that com-
pensation programs will succeed through surveys asking people
whether they would be willing to accept a facility in their commu-
nity in exchange for some form of compensation. The surveys' re-
sults show that a relatively small number of people are willing to
53. See, e.g., Inhaber, supra note 6, at 61-62.
54. This feature has been a major source of criticism in the Massachusetts pro-
gram, which allows developers to target particular communities, then requires those
communities to negotiate a compensation agreement. See infra text accompanying
notes 170-95 & 219-24.
55. Howard Kunreuther's compensation proposals, for example, seek to prevent
communities from strategically under-representing their willingness to accept the fa-
cility by demanding more compensation than they actually are willing to accept.
Under his proposal, every community that could host the facility would submit under
seal its "bid"-the lowest amount it would accept as compensation for hosting the
facility. The lowest bid would be accepted, and all other communities would then be
required to contribute towards the compensation payment an amount based upon its
own bid. See Kunreuther et al., supra note 1, at 374-78; Kunreuther & Kleindorfer,
supra note 48, at 296.
56. For explorations of the efficiency aspects of compensation mechanisms, see,
e.g., Gerald R. Faulhaber & Daniel E. Ingberman, Markets vs. Governments: The
Political Economy of NIMBY (1993) (unpublished working paper, on file with au-
thor); Mumphrey & Wolpert, supra note 16, at 117; James Richardson, Nash-Efficient
Siting of Hazardous Facilities, 26 Socio-EcON. PLAN. SCI. 191 (1992).
57. Kleindorfer, supra note 1, at 204-05.
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change their mind about a facility in exchange for compensation.
The studies are reported here with those finding the greatest
change in opinion listed first.
A survey of a sample of Wyoming voters about their willingness
to accept a hazardous waste facility in or near their community re-
vealed that 51% initially expressed a willingness to host the facility,
32% initially were opposed, and the remaining 17% initially were
undecided.5 8 Of those initially opposed, 10% indicated a willing-
ness to accept the facility upon provision of additional state funds
to the community. Moreover, 40% indicated a willingness to ac-
cept the facility if negotiations between community officials and
site developers included citizen representatives, or if residents were
provided more information about safety measures.5 9 Of the 17%
who initially were undecided, 31% indicated a willingness to host
the facility in exchange for additional state funds, and 76% and
80% were willing to accept the facility in exchange for citizen rep-
resentation or more information, respectively. 6° Thus, 7% of all
respondents were more accepting of the facility if additional state
funds were made available to the community, and 15% and 16%
were more accepting if citizen representation or more safety infor-
mation, respectively, were provided.61 The survey concluded that
incentives could serve to sway many undecided voters and a minor-
ity of those initially opposed to the facility.62
Similarly, a sample of Wisconsin residents were surveyed about
whether they would oppose a radioactive waste repository, then
were asked whether various incentives, including mitigation, com-
pensation, and enhanced community control would change their
minds. Incentives that guaranteed community control, such as in-
dependent monitoring and representation on the facility's board,
changed the percentage of people supporting the facility from 26%
to 41%.63
Professor Rae Zimmerman surveyed a sample of New York City
residents regarding their attitudes towards New York City's pro-
posed "sludge management plan." Although respondents did not
58. Charles Davis, Public Involvement in Hazardous Waste Siting Decisions, 19
POLITY 296, 300-01 (1986). The Wyoming sample resulted in an unusually high per-
centage of people initially indicating a willingness to accept the facility. Id. at 301.
59. Id. at 302.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 302-03.
62. Id. at 303.
63. S.A. Carnes et al., Incentives and Nuclear Waste Siting: Prospects and Con-
straints, 7 ENERGY SYs. & POL'Y 324, 335 (1983).
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state whether they would oppose the siting of a sludge facility such
as a landfill or incinerator in their neighborhoods, 55% stated that
they thought it was very likely that a landfill would cause negative
health effects, 57% believed it would lower the neighborhood's
quaiity of life, and 64% believed it would cause a decline in neigh-
borhood property values. When asked if various forms of compen-
sation would "help ... to get the activity approved," 41% of the
respondents stated that the provision of neighborhood benefits,
such as recreation facilities, would "help a lot" to get the facility
approved, and another 30% thought such benefits would "help
somewhat." 64
Professor Kent Portney reported on a survey of a random sam-
ple of residents of five Massachusetts communities and a sample of
500 people across the nation. In Massachusetts, 61.9% of the re-
spondents were "opposed" or "mostly opposed" to siting a hazard-
ous waste facility in their community.65 Nationwide, 54.6% were
similarly opposed.66 Opponents of a siting were asked whether
they would feel differently if they were offered various incentives,
such as a $50 payment to each family in town, property value guar-
antees, an annual fee to the town, improved fire protection, and
regular safety inspections by public officials and local citizens. In
the Massachusetts survey, 43.9% of those initially opposed to the
siting changed their minds when offered at least one form of com-
pensation.67 In the nationwide survey, the percentage of oppo-
nents who changed their minds was 33.6%.68 In both surveys, the
offer of regular safety inspections by public officials and local citi-
zens swayed the most opinions.69
Patricia Freeman surveyed a random sample of adults in Tennes-
see and found, like Portney, that offering to allow a local commit-
tee to monitor the facility's safety was most likely to sway people's
willingness to host a hazardous facility: 51% of those questioned
said they would view a proposal more favorably if it contained that
64. RAE ZIMMERMAN ET AL., SURVEY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL RISK, NEW YORK CITY SLUDGE MANAGEMENT PLAN 14-15, 18-19 (1991). The
question is somewhat ambiguous, because it does not ask a respondent whether he or
she would be more receptive to the proposal if compensation was offered. It is possi-
ble that respondents believed that the offer of compensation would make the propo-
sal more acceptable to politicians or to other citizens, even though the individual
respondent would not change her mind as a result of the compensation.
65. PORTNEY, supra note 34, at 13.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 34-35.
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offer.70 In contrast, only 28% indicated they would view a propo-
sal more favorably if it would mean lower county taxes, and only
34% reported they were more willing to accept a facility if it pro-
vided 1,000 new jobs (a very high number for such facilities).7' In
addition, 5% to 6% of those surveyed indicated that offers of com-
pensation would negatively impact their view of the proposal.72
Daniel Swartzman surveyed members of eight groups in a rural
community near major transportation routes. The community was
typical of the type of town selected as a host community, but had
never been involved in a siting controversy.73 Respondents were
asked whether they would be willing to live within a mile of a haz-
ardous waste landfill under various scenarios. In the first scenario,
only 3.8% of the respondents indicated that they were willing to
live within one mile of the landfill if the facility resulted in no prop-
erty tax decreases. However, respondent willingness increased to
6.9, 10.7, and 13.7% if the facility resulted in a 25, 50, and 75%
reduction in property taxes, respectively.74 Under another scena-
rio, only 4.1% of the respondents were willing to live within a mile
of the facility if no annual user fee was paid to the community.
Willingness increased to 9.1, 14.3, and 17.3% if the facility paid
$50,000, $200,000, and $500,000 in annual user fees.75 Only 3.2% of
the respondents were willing to live within one mile of the facility if
the safety of the facility were monitored by the facility's operator.
This number more than tripled if the state, private consultants, or
local community members were involved in the monitoring.76
Under the final scenario, 6% of the respondents were willing to
live within one mile of the facility if the safety monitoring were
performed quarterly. That number jumped, respectively, to 7%,
16%, and 20% if the monitoring were performed monthly, weekly,
or daily.77
Howard Kunreuther surveyed a national sample of households
and a sample of Nevada residents about their willingness to host a
70. Patricia K. Freeman et al., Legislative Representation on a Technical Policy Is-
sue: Hazardous Waste in Tennessee, 26 Soc. Sci. J. 455, 460 (1989).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Daniel Swartzman et al., Reducing Aversion to Living Near Hazardous Waste
Facilities Through Compensation and Risk Reduction, 20 J. ENVTL. MGmrT. 43, 47
(1985).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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high-level nuclear waste repository.78 When asked how important
a measure was in gaining support for the facility, "large grants for
community facilities" were rated as very important by 47.9% of the
Nevada sample and 42.4% of the national sample; property value
guarantees were rated very important by 60.1% of the Nevada
sample (the question was not asked of the national sample); and
empowering a local committee to advise the facility's management
on safety issues was viewed as very important by 69.8% of the Ne-
vada sample and 67.8% of the national sample. 79
Some of these studies can be criticized as inconclusive because
they fail to specify the precise level of compensation that would be
paid, or set ridiculously low compensation levels.80 All can be criti-
cized on the grounds that answers to hypothetical questions may
not accurately reflect what people actually will do when confronted
with a compensation proposal for a real facility.
Nevertheless, the studies provide substantial evidence that at
least those compensation measures that guarantee local monitoring
and control may sway a significant number of people to accept a
facility. The studies also suggest that while compensation measures
may not be sufficient to secure acceptance, they nevertheless may
be necessary to gain sufficient support for the facility.
III. Compensated Siting In The Real World
A. Compensated Siting and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980
("LLRWPA" or "the Act") required every state to "provide[ ] for
the availability of [disposal] capacity" for low-level radioactive
waste generated within the state.81 The Act made clear, however,
that it did not require each state to have its own disposal facility;
instead, states were allowed to form interstate compacts whereby
one state within the compact would host a regional facility." As of
January 1994, ten interstate compacts have been formed; five
78. Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nu-
clear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RIsK ANALYSIS 469 (1990).
79. Douglas V. Easterling, Siting Strategies to Instill Legitimacy: The Case of
High-Level Nuclear Waste 154 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania).
80. Inhaber, supra note 48, at 814.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d (1988).
82. Id.
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states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are unaffiliated
with any compact.83
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments of
1985 allowed states and compacts to collect surcharges to "mitigate
the impact of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities on the
host [s]tate. ' ' 84 The selection of the initial host state was an issue in
four of the ten compacts.85 Each of those four compacts employed
a voluntary commpensated siting program to identify the host
state. All those efforts failed. 6
83. Nine compacts have received all necessary approvals. ENGLISH, supra note 2,
at 7-16, 161; Wyoming Switches Radioactive Waste Compacts, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
No. 9, at 711 (June 26, 1992); Midwest Compact Decides to Oust Michigan, Says State
Stalled Site-Selection Process, 22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 835 (Aug. 2, 1991).
Texas, Vermont, and Maine have formed a tenth compact. That compact will not be
official until it is approved by the Vermont legislature, then by Congress. Maine Votes
to Send Waste to Texas, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 1993, at A25; Gary Enos, High-
Level Trouble; Radioactive-Waste Compacts Stalled, CITY & STATE, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1;
Texas Agrees to Host Disposal Site in Low-Level Compact with Vermont, Maine, 24
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 323 (June 18, 1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c) & (d)
(1988). Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island
have not joined a compact. Hoversten, supra note 7, at 12A.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(E)(i) (1988).
85. Of the ten compacts, six had no need to induce states to volunteer to host the
regional facility. The Northwest Compact was built around an existing facility in Han-
ford, Washington, and had no need to identify another host site. Joanne Omang,
States Are Juggling A-Waste Disposal Like Hot, ah, Potato, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1983,
at A3. The Rocky Mountain Compact contracted with the Northwest Compact to
send its waste to the Hanford site, and consequently had no need to identify a host
site. In four of the remaining compacts, a state that produced large amounts of waste
agreed to host a regional site for a few other states that produce little waste, in order
to secure the advantages of compact membership. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 128; Mar-
shall Ingwerson, State Officials Eye Nuclear Waste Decision, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Sept. 12, 1986, at 3. Thus, the Central Midwest Compact was a marriage of
convenience between Illinois, the biggest producer of LLRW in the midwest, and
Kentucky, a low volume producing state. The Appalachian Compact was based on
the understanding that Pennsylvania, one of the country's largest producers of
LLRW, would host the regional site for Maryland, Delaware, and West Virginia, all
low volume producing states. Matthew L. Wald, Jersey and Connecticut Set Back on
Atom Dump, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1985, at B3; Katherine Roberts & Carlyle C.
Couglas, States Change Partners on Nuclear Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1985, § 4, at 7.
The Southwestern Compact, in which California agreed to host a regional facility for
Arizona and the Dakotas, was similarly motivated. Jerry Gillam, Capitol Political
Bombshell Fused by Nuclear Dump, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1985, § 1, at 3. The so-
called "surf & turf' compact between Texas, Vermont, and Maine was formed after
Texas sought low-volume states as partners in its compact. Paul Marks, State Finding
Few Takers for its Low-Level Nuclear Waste, HARTFORD COURANT, May 24, 1992, at
Al.
86. Some of the five states that eschewed regional compacts also have tried to
attract volunteer host communities through compensation proposals, but none has yet
been successful. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
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The Midwest Compact Commission (originally composed of In-
diana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin)
mailed a brochure to every county in the compact, offering $2 mil-
lion in annual benefits to a host community. The benefit package
included $800,000 in unrestricted revenue, $400,000 in wages, and
$800,000 in spending by the facility and its employees.88 The host
state would receive an additional $600,000 annually.89 Although
some communities expressed interest, their states declined to vol-
unteer.9 Due to the absence of volunteers, Michigan was selected
as the host state on the basis of the quantity of waste it generated. 91
Michigan eventually was ousted from the Midwest Compact after
extended disputes over the funding and criteria for selecting a host
community; Ohio replaced Michigan as the host state.92
Similarly, the Southeast Compact asked each of its member
states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) to consider the compen-
sation and conditions it would require to host the compact's facil-
ity. No state volunteered,93 and North Carolina eventually was
selected as the host state.94 The Central Compact (Arkansas, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Nebraska) also unsuccessfully
sought a volunteer host state.9 5 The Northeast Compact, com-
posed of New Jersey and Connecticut, discussed how each might
compensate the other for hosting a regional facility, but neither
87. Howard Witt, Seven States "Bid" for Toxic Waste Facility, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Aug. 21, 1986, at 3.
88. Seven States to Offer Incentives for Atomic Waste Disposal Site, WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 1986, at A16.
89. Washington Department Gives Tacoma Grant to Construct Waste-to-Electric
Energy Plant, 17 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 674 (Sept. 5, 1986); cf ENGLISH, supra
note 2, at 32 (describing the incentive package as $500,000 annually to the host state
and $800,000 annually to the host community).
90. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 32; Michigan Chosen from Midwest Compact as Site
for Low-Level Waste Repository, 18 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 750 (July 3, 1987).
91. Michigan Chosen from Midwest Compact as Site for Low-Level Waste Reposi.
tory, 18 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 750 (July 3, 1987).
92. Midwest Compact Decides to Oust Michigan, Says State Stalled Site-Selection
Process, 22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 835 (Aug. 2, 1991).
93. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 119-20.
94. Choice of North Carolina as Host for Facility Triggers Debate in State on Avail-
able Options, 17 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 794 (Sept. 26, 1986).
95. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 131.
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would agree to the arrangement.96 Eventually, the two states
agreed that each would site their own facility.97
Once each of the compacts had designated a host state, the host
states and their compacts often used compensation to try to induce
communities within the host state to volunteer to be the host com-
munity. Again, such attempts met with little success.
For example, in the Central Midwest Compact (consisting of Illi-
nois and Kentucky) the small town of Martinsville in Clark County,
Illinois,98 initially indicated an interest in accepting the facility. 99
Martinsville received $1.2 million in unrestricted funds during the
site review process, and was promised approximately $1 million in
annual user fees and an influx of 100 jobs if the facility were lo-
cated in the town.10° In a referendum conducted in November
1988, 68% of the Martinsville voters, but only 41% of the Clark
County voters, favored the facility. 01 In November 1990, a second
referendum revealed that 56% of the Martinsville voters and only
26% of the Clark County voters continued to favor the project.10 2
In January 1991, Martinsvillle adopted a resolution in favor of host-
ing the site as long as its officials were involved "in all aspects of
the process, including the selection of the [facility] contractor...,
negotiations regarding compensation and incentive measures, local
oversight procedures, and other matters of local concern ....",03
After extensive hearings, however, the state's siting commission re-jected the site in 1992.104 Illinois recently revamped its siting pro-
96. Bob Narus, Radioactive Waste Talks Set, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1987, § 11, at 4;
see also E. Michael Blake, Twenty Nagging Questions and Not-Necesssarily-Satisfying
Answers about LLW Management in the United States, NUCLEAR NEWS, Dec. 1993, at
42 (describing the history of the Northeast Compact).
97. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 128; Blake, supra note 96.
98. Wayne County, Illinois also expressed interest but its board of supervisors
eventually voted against hosting the facility. See Thomas W. Lippman, Possibility of
Nuclear Dump Leaves Illinois County Bitterly Divided, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 1990, at
A3 (describing payment of $950,000 to Wayne County for the right to test the area for
geological and soil suitability).
99. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 55-65.
100. Chad Carlton, No Takers for State's Nuclear Dump, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 3,
1988, at 9.
101. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 57.
102. Id. at 65.
103. Id. (quoting Resolution of the Martinsville City Council (Jan. 9, 1991), as re-
ported in The Reporter (Martinsville, I11.), January 10, 1991)).
104. Rejection of Illinois Site as Low-Level Dump Could Raise Midwest Industries'
Disposal Costs, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1640 (Oct. 23, 1992).
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cess to require the identification of potential host sites through
scientific and technical screening, in addition to volunteerism.10 5
In the Southwestern Compact (California, Arizona, North Da-
kota, and South Dakota), three communities in California were
"not only willing, but eager for the jobs and revenue promised by a
new industry.' 10 6 One of these three was selected for the site.
Continued opposition to the site from a wide variety of interests,
however, has stalled the siting process. 10 7
In the Southeast compact, 0 8 North Carolina initially sought vol-
unteers from among its local governments by offering the host
community 2.5% of the facility's annual gross receipts, an annual
"privilege license tax," and other benefits.'0 9 Northampton County
volunteered to host the facility, which promised to provide the
county between 150 and 300 new jobs and $3.5 million annually."10
The site was dropped from consideration, however, after thousands
of county residents protested the proposal."' Siting officials then
turned their attention to sites in Richmond and Wake Counties.1 1 2
105. Under the new siting scheme, siting authorities will select at least ten potential
sites on the basis of water and geological surveys. In addition, sites volunteered by
landowners or local governments will be considered. The siting authority will then
select an appropriate site on the basis of technical and scientific merit. Blake, supra
note 96; Illinois Low-Level Waste Siting Law Approved - Almost, NUCLEAR WASTE
NEWS, Feb. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, BNAENV File.
106. Shawn Hubler, Only California is on Track for Nuclear Dump, L.A. TIMES,
May 20, 1991, at Al; see also Richard C. Paddock, Accord Reached on Pact on Radio-
active Dumping, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, § 1, at 3.
107. See Dale Vargas, Nuke Waste Piles Up as Dump Fight Rages, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 29, 1993, at Al; Abraham Kwok & Pamela Manson, Nuclear Waste Dump
Opposed Foes Call It Threat to Colorado River, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1993, at B1.
108. Because of the jobs and economic benefits the facility brings to the surround-
ing community, residents of Barnwell County, South Carolina, where the Southeast
Compact's current facility is located, are fighting to keep the Barnwell facility open.
Paul Marks, Two States Poles Apart, HARTFORD COURANT, June 21, 1991, at Al;
Daniel P. Jones, Waste-Disposal Costs Jump as State Misses Deadline, HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 3, 1992, at Al.
109. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 131. In 1991, North Carolina's siting authority rec-
ommended that the host community's share of the gross receipts be increased to 6%,
or about $2.5 million annually. Id.
110. Joe Drape, Officials' Pursuit of Waste Burner Inflames N.C. County, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Feb. 23, 1991, at A2; County Torn Over Hazardous Waste Facility As
North Carolina Searches State for Location, 21 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1839-40
(Feb. 15, 1991). But see ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 125 (more than two years after
North Carolina sought a volunteer host, no community had volunteered).
111. Drape, supra note 110, at A2.
112. 'Carrot-Stick Approach' taken by Authority to Spur Contractor to Meet S.E.
Compact Goals, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1712 (Nov. 6, 1992).
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Those counties objected to the proposed facility."13 On December
8, 1993, North Carolina's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment Authority designated the Wake County site as the "preferred
site," and has begun the license review process."
4
Nebraska, which was chosen by the Central States Compact (Ar-
kansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) to host the
regional facility, has offered $1 million per year to the community
that agrees to accept the facility." 5 However, no community has
volunteered to accept the site. In April 1993, dissatisfied over Ne-
braska's lack of progress in siting a facility, the Southeast Compact
Commission voted to close their regional facility in Barnwell,
South Carolina to shipments of waste from states in the Central
Compact. 16
Connecticut, which along with New Jersey forms the Northeast
Compact, also offered compensation to induce communities to step
forward and volunteer for the facility." 7 Connecticut's offer origi-
nally included about $750,000 per year in taxes and money for
roads, as well as property value guarantees for neighboring prop-
113. The counties sued to prevent further consideration of their sites, but the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the counties' claims were not yet justiciable. Rich-
mond County v. North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Auth., 436 S.E.2d
113 (N.C. 1993).
114. North Carolina Picks Wake County Site for Low-Level Radwaste Disposal Fa-
cility, Hazardous Waste Bus., Dec. 15, 1993, at 4.
115. Nebraska's offer inspired "Talkin' Rad Waste Blues," a song that includes the
following stanza in its lyrics:
I said, say, mister, where you from?
You must think I'm pretty dumb.
That stuff you're peddlin's nuclear trash.
And we don't want your cold, hard cash.
Robert Dvorchak, States Gird to Take Their Nuclear Waste as U.S. Bows Out, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989, at 8.
116. The LLRWPA Amendments authorize the Southeast Compact to refuse waste
from states or compacts that are not meeting deadlines for the development of their
own facilities. Southeast Compact Closes Barnwell to Five States in Central Compact,
23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 3202 (April 23, 1993). In October 1993, the South-
east Compact voted to allow the Central Compact to resume using the Barnwell site
until June 30, 1994, apparently satisfied that Nebraska was making progress toward
site selection. Southeastern Compact Commission Renews Disposal Contract with Five
Central States, 24 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1177 (Oct. 22, 1993). For descriptions
of the site selection process in Nebraska, see Blake, supra note 96; Richard R. Zu-
ercher, Nelson Renews Boyd County Fight After Generators Win LLW Access, NUCLE-
ONICS WEEK, Nov. 11, 1993, at 1.
117. Although Connecticut offered Texas $100 million for the opportunity to send
its waste to Texas, Texas refused. Kevin Mayhood, Be the First to Volunteer and Keep
a Dump Away, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1993, § 13CN, at 6; Texas Compact: Likely Yes to
Me., Vt., No to Conn., NUCLEAR NEWS, June 1993, at 70.
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erty owners.1 18 According to a spokesperson for the research com-
pany hired to select a site, the initial effort to find a volunteer
community yielded "some response." ' 9 Nevertheless, the three
communities identified as the leading potential sites were vehe-
mently opposed to the siting.' 20 Consequently, the state aban-
doned the proposed sitings, and is focusing again on providing
sufficient incentives to motivate a community to volunteer. Con-
necticut's current incentives include $350,000 for the first town to
volunteer to be studied for a site, another $250,000 for completing
negotiations regarding the facility, an additional $1 million for vot-
ing to approve the negotiated agreement and accept the facility,
and $1 million annually for hosting the facility. 12 1 In April 1993,
Connecticut's Hazardous Waste Management Service announced
that it would not receive proposals from volunteers until late 1993
or early 1994.122 Accordingly, no conclusions can yet be drawn
about the likely success of the new incentives. The other half of
the Northeast Compact, New Jersey, adopted a "volunteer pro-
cess" to find a host site in late 1993.12 Again, it is too soon to
assess the program's success.
In the Midwest Compact, little progress has been made toward
the selection of a site since Ohio was designated as the host state.
Indeed, Ohio has yet to agree upon a site selection procedure,
although the leading lroposals for a siting process include compen-
sating the host community. 24
In the Appalachian Compact, Pennsylvania is using financial in-
centives to urge communities to host a facility. 25 Several commu-
nities have expressed interest, but the contractor hired to
recommend a site has chosen to complete a three stage state-wide
site screening process before examing those communities' propos-
118. Jennifer Kaylin, Nuclear Dump Needs a Home; Communities Can't Say No,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, § 12CN, at 1.
119. Id.
120. Luz Villarreal, Ten Years Ago, Radioactive Dump Passive Issue, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 13, 1991, at D1.
121. Mayhood, supra note 117, at 6.
122. Daniel P. Jones, No Offers to Serve as Dump Site, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr.
8, 1993, at Cll.
123. Blake, supra note 96, at 42.
124. T.C. Brown, Nuclear Waste Panels Hand In Reports Set up Independant Au-
thority, Plan For 500 Years, One Says, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 3, 1993, at 3B; T.C.
Brown, Areas Seen As Unlikely for Waste Site, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 14, 1993, at
5B; T.C. Brown, Nuclear Waste Site Issue Needs PR: Advisors Suggest Educating Pub-
lic, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 1993, at 3B.
125. Northeast: Clean Air Tops the List of Regional Issues, GREENWIRE, Oct. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, BNAENV File.
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als.'26 The first two stages of the process have been completed, and
have disqualified about 46% of the state's land from further con-
sideration. 127 The screening process is not expected to identify any
potential sites until early 1995.128
In the tentative compact between Texas, Maine, and Vermont,
Texas chose a site in Hudspeth County, near the Mexican bor-
der. 29 Because the county was not asked to vote on the facility,
there is some dispute over whether Hudspeth County is a "volun-
teer" host.13  The siting agreement provides that the county will
receive a total of $5 million from Maine and Vermont in exchange
for hosting the site, plus 10% of the facility's annual gross
receipts.1 3 '
New York, which chose not to join a regional compact, 132 also
sought to induce communities to step forward by offering a signifi-
cant incentive package..One town, West Valley, reportedly negoti-
ated an incentive package totalling $4.2 million in benefits ranging
from a new town park to college scholarships for local teenagers, as
well as $1.5 million annually in new taxes and fees.133 Residents of
the town voted in a nonbinding referendum to reject the facility,
but town officials neveriheless voted to accept it.'34 Under existing
state law, however, the town is prohibited from taking low-level
radioactive waste because it already hosts an inactive high-level ra-
126. Richard R. Zuercher, Audit, Complex Siting Issues Delay LLW Site Selection
in Pennsylvania, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Jan. 28, 1993, at 7.
127. Nearly Half of Pa. Land Nixed in Site Screening, NUCLEAR NEWS, Apr. 1993,
at 69.
128. Enos, supra note 83, at 1.
129. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 402.0921 (West 1992).
130. For a description of the events leading to the selection of the site, see Roy
Bragg, Waste Not, Want Not; Nuclear Site Sparks Furor in W. Texas, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 16, 1992, § State, at 1.
131. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 403.006 section 2.01(13) (West Supp.
1994).
132. Several other states that decided to remain outside compacts have made no
progress toward siting a facility. See Enos, supra note 83, at 1 (New Hampshire has
yet to even announce a siting policy); Scott Allen, Landfill Closing May Create Crisis
for Nuclear Industries, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1993, at 41 (Massachusetts will not
even decide whether to search for an in-state site until 1994).
133. Sam H. Verhovek, Anxious Town Might Say Yes to a Nuclear Waste Dump,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at B1.
134. Sam H. Verhovek, Despite Voters' 'No,' Board Allows Dump for Nuclear
Waste, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at Al.
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dioactive waste facility. 35 To date, the New York legislature has
not acted to lift that ban. 36
In sum, although most of the compacts and selected host states
have used compensation to encourage host site volunteers, only
California, North Carolina, and Texas have designated a commu-
nity to host their facilities. 37 The host designated by North Caro-
lina opposes the designation 138 and it is questionable that the host
Texas selected actually volunteered for the site.' 39 Even in Califor-
nia, where the designated host did volunteer, opposition to the fa-
cility from outside the host community may very well stall efforts
to begin construction. 140 Accordingly, compensation proposals can
hardly be seen as a success in the low level radioactive waste
context.
B. Nuclear Waste Policy Act
Both the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982141 ("NWPA" or "the
1982 Act") and its 1987 Amendments ("the Amendments") rely in
part upon compensation to induce volunteers for facilities to store
high level radioactive waste ("HLRW")1 42 and to mollify those
communities selected as host sites when there are no suitable vol-
unteers. The 1982 Act authorized compensation for host commu-
nities to replace taxes the county and state would have received
had the facility been privately owned. 43 Moreover, it authorized
"impact assistance" to host communities to compensate for any
135. Verhovek, supra note 133, at B1.
136. Blake, supra note 96; see also N.Y. A.B. 7701, 215th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1993)
(authorizing study of the site); Jon R. Sorensen, West Valley Eyed as N-Waste Site,
THE BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 7, 1993 (reporting efforts to lift the ban).
137. Hoversten, supra note 7, at 12A; North Carolina Authority Selects Site for
Southeast's Next Low-Level Facility, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1497 (Dec. 10,
1993).
138. See supra text accompanying note 113.
139. See supra text accompanying note 130.
140. See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, A Test Case for Nuclear Disposal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1994, at A8 (California's site is stalled because the federal government has not yet
agreed to transfer title to the land to the state; at least two lawsuits are pending that
also could delay the project); USGS Scientists Raise Concerns Over Ward Valley, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1531 (Dec. 17, 1993) (federal land transfer halted until
lawsuits are resolved); Indian Tribe, Citizen Groups Sue Over Licensing of Waste Site
in California, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1239 (Nov. 5, 1993) (describing suit
filed to overturn the licensing of California's site).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1983).
142. High-level radioactive waste is defined as highly radioactive material resulting
from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste and other highly
radioactive material. See 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12) (1988).
143. Id. § 10136(c)(3)(A).
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negative impacts the facility imposed.'" The 1982 Act failed, how-
ever, to make any progress toward siting HLRW facilities. 45 One
community-Oak Ridge, Tennessee-agreed to host an interim
storage facility, or monitored retrievable storage ("MRS") 1 46 in ex-
change for a package of compensation. Tennessee refused, how-
ever, to support the agreement. 47
The Amendments used additional promises of compensation to
encourage progress toward siting. 48 First, the Amendments fo-
cused on siting a "permanent" repository for HLRW at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. 49 The Amendments authorized annual pay-
ments to Nevada of $10 million during the siting and construction
phase of the project and $20 million after the facility opened.5 0
Next, the Amendments offered additional incentives for communi-
ties and states to volunteer for MRS facilities. The Amendments
established an Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator ("the Nego-
tiator") 15' and authorized the Negotiator to enter into "reasonable
and appropriate" financial and institutional arrangements with
states or Native American tribes willing to host an MRS. 52 The
Amendments specified that such financial arrangements would in-
clude a minimum of $5 million annually to the host state or tribe
for every year prior to shipment of the waste, an! $10 million an-
nually while the facility was in operation. 53
The compensation offered to Nevada has not altered the views
of the majority of Nevada residents and public officals who are
adamently opposed to the Yucca Mountain site. 54 The compensa-
tion offered to induce volunteers for MRS facilities, however, has
been more successful. To date, the compensation has been in the
144. Id. § 10136(c)(2)(A)(1).
145. For analyses of the failure of the 1982 Act, see, e.g., Easterling, supra note 79,
at 43-55; Richard H. Bryan, The Politics and Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal: The
View from Nevada, 29 ENV'T., Oct. 1987, at 14.
146. Monitored retrievable storage facilities would serve as central receiving sta-
tions for high level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel and would prepare the
waste for storage in a permanent geologic repository. See 42 U.S.C. § 10161-10169
(1988); see also Nicholas K. Brown, Monitored Retrievable Storage Within the Context
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 52 TENN. L. REV. 730 (1985).
147. Easterling, supra note 79, at 169.
148. Id. at 168-69.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1988).
150. Id. § 10173a.
151. Id. § 10242.
152. Id. § 10243(b). Such agreements would be subject to Congressional approval.
Id. § 10243(d).
153. Id. § 10173a.
154. See Bryan, supra note 145, at 33, 36; Easterling, supra note 79, at 170-75.
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form of study grants, which tribes, states, counties, and other local
governments may use to explore the feasibility of hosting an
MRS. 155 There are three types of grants. Phase I grants provide up
to $100,000 to a potential host to perform virtually any kind of
study.' 56 As of January 1994, twelve counties and Native American
tribes had been awarded Phase I grants.'57 Phase II-A grants pro-
vide up to $200,000 for undertaking more focused environmental
and technological studies of potential sites. 158 Nine tribes applied
for Phase II-A grants; four were awarded. 59 Finally, Phase II-B
grants involve amounts of up to $2.8 million, but carry with them
the expectation that the community will begin serious discussions
with the Negotiator.)6° TWo tribes have applied for a Phase II-B
grants.' 61
Given the no-strings-attached nature of Phase I and Phase II-A
grants it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions as to the ulti-
mate success of the compensation program. Moreover, the fact
that only Native American tribes (many of which have significant
unemployment and poverty 62) applied for Phase II-A grants, may
suggest that compensation proposals are attractive, if at all, only to
the most desperate of communities. Finally, the states have under-
mined the compensation program by stepping in to prevent poten-
tial volunteer communities (and a number of Indian tribes) from
applying for grants. 63 Accordingly, even if compensation can
make facilities more attractive to host communities, it may be in-
sufficient to persuade counties or states to acquiesce in the commu-
nity's desire to host a facility. 64
155. Easterling, supra note 79, at 345.
156. Id.
157. Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, Status of Department of Energy MRS
Grants (1994) (unpublished paper on file with author).
158. Easterling, supra note 79, at 345.
159. Id. at 346 n.20; Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, supra note 157.
160. Easterling, supra note 79, at 345.
161. Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, supra note 157.
162. Easterling, supra note 79, at 357. For discussions of the charge that the waste
industry has targeted Native American reservations for waste facilities because of the
tribes' poverty, see Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous
Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. REG. 229, 231, 251-53, 258, 262
(1993).
163. Easterling, supra note 79, at 362.
164. In efforts to site a low level radioactive waste facilities, communities interested
in proferred compensation also were prevented from hosting a facility by their county
or state. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 90, 101-04, 147.
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C. State Negotiated Compensation Siting Programs for
Hazardous Waste Facilities
Several states165 have adopted compensated siting as part of
their hazardous waste siting programs.166 This Section describes in
detail the experience of two state programs-Massachusetts and
Wisconsin. The Massachusetts program is highlighted because the
Massachussets Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act' 67 ("the Mas-
sachussets Act") was hailed as a major advance in siting policy by
both industry and environmentalists. 68 Moreover, it has served as
a model for other states interested in compensated siting.169 Wis-
consin is discussed because its program has enjoyed the greatest
success of any compensated siting program.
1. Massachusetts
Under the Massachusetts Act, any developer proposing to con-
struct a hazardous waste facility must notify the chief executive of-
ficers of the proposed host community and of all adjoining
communities of its plan.170 The developer is then prohibited from
constructing the facilityuntil the "local assessment committee" of
165. Although the focus of this Article is on compensation programs in the United
States, it should be noted that some Canadian provinces and several European coun-
tries also have used compensation in siting programs. GaryDavis & William Col-
glazier, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities: Asking the Right Questions in AMERICAN'S
FUTURE IN Toxic WASTE MANAGEMENT 167, 172, 174 (Bruce W. Piasecki & Gary A.
Davis eds., 1987); Inhaber, supra note 1, at 811 (discussing compensation programs in
France and Japan); Barry G. Rabe, Beyond the NIMBY Syndrome in Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting: The Albertan Breakthrough and the Prospects for Cooperation in
Canada and the United States, 4 GOVERNANCE 184 (1991) (discussing compensation in
the siting of a hazardous waste facility in Canada).
166. This section addresses only those states that have siting statutes requiring the
facility developer to negotiate a compensation agreement with the host community.
See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 47. Many other states mandate the provision of
compensation to host communities independent of agreements reached between the
developer and the host community. In those states, compensation is typically fixed at
a lump sum amount or tied to the facility's gross receipts or tons of waste processed,
or set by an administrative agency. See, e.g., statutes cited supra notes 45-46.
167. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981).
168. Jerry Ackerman, IT Withdrawal Sparks Debate Over Siting Law on Hazardous
Waste Facilities, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1984, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe
Database; Andrew Blake, IT - Other States and Other Troubles, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
2, 1982, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe Database.
169. Ackerman, supra note 168.
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7. Notice of intent also must be given to
the Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, the Department of Environmental
Management, the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, any regional
planning agency of which the host community is a member, and the persons owning or
controlling the land on which the developer proposes to construct the facility.
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the host community has accepted a "site agreement" for the
facility. 17 1
Although the Massachusetts Act's siting agreement requirement
affords potential host communities some protection against un-
wanted facilities, it also limits four significant tools that communi-
ties previously had used in excluding hazardous waste facilities
from their neighborhoods. 172 First, it prohibits a municipality from
imposing upon a facility any requirements for licenses or permits
that were not imposed prior to the effective date of the Massachu-
setts Act. 173 Second, it requires local boards of health to issue a
"site assignment permit" for the proposed site if the facility will
impose "no significantly greater danger to the public health or pub-
lic safety ... than the dangers that currently exist in the conduct
and operation of other industrial and commercial enterprises...
not engaged in the treatment, processing or disposal of hazardous
waste, but utilizing processes which are comparable.' 1 74 Next, it
prohibits a municipality from adopting zoning law changes to ex-
clude a proposed facility.' 75 Finally, it allows a facility to be con-
structed as of right on any industrially zoned site, provided that the
facility has received the applicable permits and the developer and
the municipality have entered into a site agreement. 76
The notice of intent that triggers the siting agreement negotia-
tion process must include a description of the following: the pro-
posed facility; the type of wastes it would accept; the processes that
would be used for the treatment or disposal of the wastes; the de-
veloper's prior experience in the construction and operation of
hazardous waste facilities; and the developer's plans for financing
the project. 77 In addition, the notice of intent may either name a
specific proposed site, or describe the characteristics of a theoreti-
cally ideal site and ask for possible candidates. 71
171. Id. § 12.
172. Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d.
102, 110 (Mass. 1984); Holznagel, supra note 1, at 354-55.
173. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 16.
174. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 150B (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
175. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40a, § 9 (West Supp. 1993).
176. Id. A municipality's zoning officials thus could not block a facility that the
municipality's local assessment committee had approved.
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 4.02(3)
(1982).
178. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 7, 9; MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 4.02-
4.03 (1982). If the developer seeks suggestions regarding available sites, the Depart-
ment of Environmental Management is required to accept suggestions for a site for a
period of 50 days. If no suggestions are proferred during that period, the Department
is required to extend the period for suggestions for another 30 days, and is authorized
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Once a notice of intent has been filed, the Hazardous Waste Fa-
cility Site Safety Council ("the Council") is required to determine
whether it is "complete.' 79 If the notice is deemed complete, the
Council must review the proposed project within 15 days to deter-
mine if it is "feasible and deserving of state assistance."' Follow-
ing a successful review,' 8' the developer and the proposed host
community's local assessment committee then begin negotiating
the terms under which the proposed host community would agree
to accept the facility.'8 2 The local assessment committee consists of
the chief executive officer and representatives of the proposed host
community's board of health, conservation commission, planning
board, and fire department.8 3 The committee members then elect
four residents of the municipality to serve on the committee; three
of the four must be residents of the area within the municipality
most immediately affected by the proposed facility.' 84 In addition,
the chief executive officer may appoint up to four additional mem-
to suggest sites within the proposed host community that it reasonably believes might
be "readily available" for the facility. At the conclusion of the suggestion period and
any extension of that period, the Department is required to reduce the number of
suggested sites to three, and to give notice to the community in which such a site is
located, abutting communities, and the owners of the land at issue. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21D, § 9; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 7.02-7.04.
179. MASS. REGS CODE tit. 990, §§ 4.05-4.06 (1982). The Council may make the
completeness determination only after providing the public a 45 day period to com-
ment on the notice of intent. Id.
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 5.01
(1982). The Council must make its review in consulation with the department of envi-
ronmental quality engineering. The Council's determination has been interpreted to
be a "rough preliminary review" that focuses on whether there are "readily ascertain-
able and clearly dispositive" problems with the proposal that could reasonable be
expected to prevent the project from obtaining necessary state and local approvals
later in the process. Preamble to MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 1.00-16.00 (1987); see
also tit. 990 §§ 5.02-5.04.
181. Within 30 days of the Council's determination that the proposal is feasible and
deserving of state assistance, the Council is required to begin to conduct "briefing
sessions" for the public regarding the proposed project. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D,
§ 8.
182. MASS. REOS. CODE tit. 990, § 11.01(1) (1982). Once the Council makes its
feasibility determination, the developer is required to prepare a "preliminary project
impact report" consisting of an environmental impact statement and a "social eco-
nomic appendix." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 10; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990,
§ 10.01-10.02. Although the developer and the community may begin negotiations
before that report is completed, many do not. The negotiations must begin, however,
once the developer submits a draft social economic appendix that the Council deter-
mines to be adequate. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 11.01(2).
183. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 8.01-8.03
(1982).
184. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5.
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bers, whose appointments must be approved by the municipality's
legislative body.185
The local assessment committee is charged with representing the
"best interests of the host community" by negotiating with the de-
veloper "to protect the public health, the public safety, and the en-
vironment of the host community, as well as to promote the fiscal
welfare of said community through special benefits and compensa-
tion."'18 6 The local assesment committee is authorized to negotiate
over the facility's design, construction, maintenance, operating pro-
cedures, and monitoring practices. In addition, the committee may
negotiate regarding the services the host community will provide
the developer and the compensation, services, and special benefits
that the developer will provide the host community. 187 The negoti-
ations accordingly should culminate in a siting agreement that sets
forth the steps the developer will take to minimize and mitigate the
harms the facility will impose on the community, as well as the
measures the developer will take to compensate the community for
unavoidable harms.' 88
If the negotiations fail'8 9 the Council may declare an impasse
and require the parties to submit the disputed issues to arbitra-
tion.19° The arbitrator or arbitration panel then determines the
terms of the siting agreement, taking into account the interests of
185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5; MASS. REOS. CODE tit. 990, § 8.02
(1982). The four additional members appointed by the chief executive officer may
include representatives of abutting communities, provided that those representatives
have been approved by the legislative body of the abutting community. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5.
186. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 5(1), 5(2); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990,
§ 8.06 (1982). The local assessment committee may seek "technical assistance grants"
from the Council to aid the committee in assessing the impacts the facility will have
on the community. These grants also may cover the costs the community incurs in
participating in the site selection process. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 11. The
initial grant is not to exceed $15,000, but a community may request an additional
grant, and no limit on the amount of the additional grant is specified. Id. § 4(5).
187. Id. § 12.
188. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 280. A siting agreement must be approved
by the majority of the committee. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 13.
189. Even if the negotiations have not reached an impasse, the Council may require
the developer and the committee to utilize a mediator if it finds that the negotiations
are not proceeding satisfactorily within 45 days of the Council's determination that
the developer has submitted an adequate draft socio-economic appendix. MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 11.02 (1982).
190. If the developer and the committee agree, a single arbitrator may be used.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15. Otherwise, the arbitration award will be de-
termined by majority vote of a panel of three arbitrators, one selected by the devel-
oper, one by the committee, and one by agreement of the developer and the
committee. Id.; MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 13.02 (1982).
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the host community, the developer, and abutting communities. 19'
The arbitrator or arbitration panel's determination is binding upon
the parties, 92 and is subject to judicial review only on a very nar-
row range of nonsubstantive issues.' 93
Once the parties have entered into a siting agreement, or the
arbitrator or arbitration panel has determined the terms of a siting
agreement, the Council is required to review and approve the
agreement.19 4 Only after the siting agreement is entered into does
the project begin the licensing and permitting processes designed
to ensure that the project is environmentally and technologically
sound.195
Since the Massachusetts Act was passed in 1980, it has been un-
successful in encouraging communities to accept hazardous waste
facilities. 96 Although six different developers have attempted to
site facilities under the terms of the Massachusetts Act, no facility
has been sited. The first developer, Cyclotech Corporation, pro-
posed a recycling facility for the town of Gardner, which responded
with substantial opposition. The developer agreed to be subject to
191. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 13.05 (1982).
192. The arbitration award is binding in the sense that it defines the terms under
which the facility can be constructed and operated if the developer succeeds in ob-
taining the necessary permits and licenses. The award does not preclude the munici-
pality from denying the site assignment permit that is required from the host
community's board of health, from opposing the grant of permits and licenses by
state agencies, or from challenging the award of a permit or license by those agencies.
See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 289.
193. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 makes the arbitration subject to the
provisions of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 12(a) (West 1988), which allows
courts to vacate an arbitration award only if the arbitatrator committed fraud, showed
demonstrable partiality, or exceeded his or her powers. For a discussion of the re-
viewability of the arbitration award, see Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 297-301.
194. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 10; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 14.02
'(1982). For a discussion of the Massachusetts Act's ambiguities regarding the nature
of the Council's review of siting agreements, see Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at
292-93.
195. For a description of the provisions of the Massachusetts Act that do not per-
tain to the compensation and negotiation processes and thus are not discussed here,
see Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 284-86; Holznagel, supra note 1, at 366-68;
Denise Provost, The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act: What Impact
on Municipal Power to'Exclude and Regulate, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 715, 734-
35 (1983); Note, The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Controversy: the Massachusetts
Experience, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 137-38 (1987) [hereinafter "Massachusetts
Experience"].
196. See James L. Franklin, State May Lose $50M in Waste Cleanup Funds, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1991, at 24; Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Site Safety Council,
Summary and Explanation of Bill to Establish a New Process for Siting Hazardous
Waste Facilities in Massachusetts 1 (May 22, 1992) (unpublished memorandum, on
file with author).
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the results of a referendum on the facility, which it lost by a nearly
three to one vote.197
Next, Solv. Incorporated proposed that a solvent recovery facil-
ity be located in the town of Haverhill. Although the Council de-
termined that the project met "the feasible and deserving of state
assistance" threshold, the project met intense resistance, especially
after a fire destroyed a similiar plant that the developer operated in
New Jersey. 198 The project stalled when Haverhill sought judicial
review of the Council's feasibility determination. 99 Solv. Incorpo-
rated eventually withdrew its proposal.200
A third facility was proposed by Envirite (which was named
Liqwacon when the facility was first proposed). Although Envir-
ite's notice of intent did not specify a proposed site, local landown-
ers volunteered five sites. Freetown, in which two of these sites
were located, initially expressed an interest in the facility.20' That
community eventually rejected the proposal, however, by a vote of
1575 to 471, with 58% of those registered voting. 02 Envirite then
withdrew the proposal.0 3
Fourth, IT Corporation, proposed a multipurpose waste process
facility for the town of Warren.2° The town responded by bringing
a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of
the Massachusetts Act.20 1 It also passed several by-law amend-
ments meant to prevent the construction of the proposed facility.
The first by-law amendment prohibited hazardous waste facilities
within the town's borders except to store, treat, or dispose of
wastes generated within the town 21-a tactic not expressly fore-
197. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 302.
198. Andrew Blake, Panel Due to Act Tomorrow on Sites for Waste Facility, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1981, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe Database; Susan Garland,
New England Braces for its First Toxic Waste Landfill Site, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 10, 1981, at 6.
199. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 303.
200. Massachusetts Experience, supra note 195, at 139.
201. Stephen Zisson, 5 Mass. Sites Offered for Toxic Waste Plant, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 1981, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe Database.
202. Freetown Voters Reject Proposed Treatment Plant, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8,
1983, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe Database.
203. Ackerman, Firm Cancels Plans for Waste Plant, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17,
1983, available in Westlaw, Bostglobe Database.
204. IT's original notice of intent did not specify a site for the proposed plant, but
by the end of 1981, IT had narrowed its focus to two sites within the town of Warren.
Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102, 107
(1984).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 107; see also Massachusetts Experience, supra note 195, at 140.
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closed by the Massachusettes Act.20 7 The second by-law amend-
ment prohibited hazardous waste facilities within 500 feet of
certain water resources.208 The Massachusetts Superior Court dis-
missed the town's action, and declared the by-law amendments to
have been preempted by the Massachusetts Act.20 9 Although the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior
Court's decision,210 IT Corporation dropped its proposal shortly af-
ter the court's decision was announced, citing the high cost and
uncertainty of going forward. 1 '
A fifth proposal by Clean Harbors, Incorporated, sought to lo-
cate a solvent-recovery facility in an industrial park in the town of
Taunton. The company withdrew its proposal, however, after
neighboring industries objected to the siting.21 2 Clean Harbors also
proposed to build an incinerator in the town of East Braintree.
Following a four year process, the proposal was rejected when the
state's Department of Environmental Protection determined that
the proposed project posed health and safety problems.213
Finally, Recontek proposed to construct a recycling plant, but
did not specify a particular site.214 After several towns competed
to host the site, the company selected a site in the town of Or-
207. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 303.
208. Town of Warren, 466 N.E.2d at 107.
209. Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 13 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,466, at 20,470 (Mass. Super Ct. Jan. 5, 1983).
210. Town of Warren, 466 N.E.2d, at 102. For a description of the litigation, see
Massachusetts Experience, supra note 195, at 141-43.
211. Ackerman, supra note 168; Charles A. Radin, IT Drops Plan for Waste Plant,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1984, at 1.
212. Jerry Ackerman, Hazardous-Waste Hauling Firm Shelves Plan for Taunton
Plant, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1985, § Metro, at 23; James Simon, State to Try Eco-
nomic Lure in Search for Chemical-Waste Site, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1985,
§ Metro, at 35.
213. James L. Franklin, Braintree Incinerator Plan Killed, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20,
1990, § Metro, at 1. Clean Harbors spent between $14 and $16 million on its efforts to
site the plant, and opponents spent more than $500,000. See Elsa C. Arnett, Permit
Denial Will be Costly Clean Harbors' Failed Incinerator Bid Leads to $16M Writeoff,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1990, § Business, at 53; Patricia Nealon, For Clean Harbors,
New Fight to Keep Old Plant, BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 1991, § South Weekly, at 1.
For reports of community opposition to the project, see James L. Franklin, State Stud-
ies of Health, Siting Are Incinerator's Next Hurdles, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1990,
§ Metro/Region, at 24; Patricia Nealon, Opponents of Toxins Incinerator Show New
Stridency: Fight Over Clean Harbors Plan Escalates, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1989,
§ South Weekly, at 1.
214. Ross Gelbspan, Proposed Orange Waste Plant Gets Boost from Illinois Visit,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991, § Metro/Region, at 43.
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21ange. 15 The developer assured Orange that the facility would pro-
vide 180 new jobs, and would pump $65 million annually into the
local economy.216 In March 1991, the town voted in a nonbinding
referendum to continue examining the proposal, but voted 1,036 to
809 against the proposed location of the plant.217 The proposal
floundered in 1992, however, when the Council refused the devel-
oper's requests to delay the siting process.218
The Massachusetts Act has been the subject of considerable criti-
cism and many calls for change.21 9 Most recently, the Council itself
proposed amendments to the Act which substantially revamp the
siting process. 220 Those revisions primarily seek to ensure that sci-
entific and technical reviews of proposed facilities are completed
before the proposed host community is required to negotiate with
the developer.22' In addition, the proposed amendments continue
to emphasize the role of mitigation and compensation in securing
the host community's acquiescence to the facility.222 One proposed
215. John Glass, Recontek Courts Small Town with Big Promises, BOSTON Bus. J.,
July 23, 1990, at 1.
216. James L. Franklin, Waste Recovery Plant Near Quabbin Wins Initial OK, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1990, § Metro/Region, at 21.
217. James L. Franklin, State May Lose $50M in Waste Cleanup Funds, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1991, § Metro/Region, at 24.
218. Massachusetts, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Sept. 1 1992, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, CURNWS File.
219. For thoughtful analyses of the Act's successes and failures, see Rodgers, supra
note 22, at 27-38.
220. Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, supra note 196.
The Council's proposals are adopted in large part, but not in their entirety, in Mass.
H.B. 4815, 178th Gen. Ct., 1993 Reg. Sess. The Council's recommendations were
based in significant part upon an evaluation of the Act by a blue-ribbon panel of
experts. James L. Franklin, Waste Plant Siting Revamp Is Called for Panel. Promo-
tion, Regulation of Facilities Should Be Separate, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1990,
§ Metro, at 15.
221. For example, while the current Act allows a developer to file a notice of intent,
and begin negotiations with the host community as soon as the Council has issued a
determination that the proposal is feasible and deserving of assistance, see supra text
accompanying notes 180-83, the proposed amendments would require the developer
to obtain a "certificate of qualification" from the state before submitting any site spe-
cific proposal for a facility. The certificate of qualification would be a determination
that the proposed facility is needed, that the proposed facility is technologically
sound, and that the developer is qualified to build and operate the facility. See Mass.
H.B. 4815, 178th Gen. Ct., 1993 Reg. Sess.; Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility
Site Safety Council, supra note 196, at 5-6. These changes respond to the persistent
argument that a project should be subjected to a much more searching review than
the Council's "feasible and deserving" determination before a community is required
to begin negotiations. See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 42-43; Jonathan Brock,
Mandated Mediation: A Contradiction in Terms, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 71-76 (1991).
222. See Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, supra note
196, at 1-2.
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amendment, for example, would require the Council to adopt regu-
lations specifying the minimum compensation that could be paid to
a host community.223 Another proposed change would include in
the terms of the facility's license any mitigation measures sought by
the community.224
The tenaciousness of the notion of compensated siting is evi-
denced by the fact that compensation remains a major part of the
siting process despite the Massachusetts Act's failures over the past
fourteen years. It is impossible to dismiss the theory of compensa-
tion because of the failures in Massachusetts, however, due to the
difficulty of pinpointing the causes of those failures. Given that
difficulty, and the lack of proven alternatives, it therefore is not
surprising that there is little impetus to abandon the emphasis the
Massachusetts Act places on compensation.
2. Wisconsin
The siting process in Wisconsin proceeds on two independent
tracks. The first track involves the state licensing process, and the
second involves local approval of the facility.225 The local approval
process begins when the developer applies for any permits,
licenses, zoning variances, special use permits, or other approvals
required by the proposed host community.226 Within sixty days of
such applications, the host community, the host county, and any
223. The Council's proposed amendments seem to envision that a host community
could negotiate for compensation beyond the minimums specified by regulation, and
to negotiate for conditions regarding the facility's construction and operation beyond
those included in the facility's license. See, Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility
Site Safety Council, supra note 196, at 9-11. H.B. 4815, on the other hand, seems to
limit communities to the compensation specified in the minimum schedule, and pre-
clude communities from imposing conditions upon the facility other than those ac-
cepted by the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection in the
facility licensing procedure. See Mass. H.B. 4815 §§ 9-10, 178th Gen. Ct., 1993 Reg.
Sess.
224. See, Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, supra note
196, at 9-11; Mass. H.B. 4815 § 9, 178th Gen. Ct., 1993 Reg. Sess.
225. For a description of the state permitting track, see Arthur J. Harrington, The
Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 MARQ.
L. REV. 223, 242-52, 266-70 (1983); Mary Beth Arnett, Down in the Dumps and
Wasted: The Need Determination in the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 Wis.
L. REV. 543, 549-56. For discussions of the local negotiating track, see Bingham &
Miller, supra note 9, at 482-83; Harrington, supra, at 259-66.
226. Like the Massachusetts statute, the Wisconsin statute limits the ability of mu-
nicipalities to block a proposed facility by adopting new permitting processes. Munic-
ipalities may require developers to secure only those approvals that were in effect at
least 15 months before the developer submitted either an "initial site report" or "fea-
sibility report," the documents that trigger the state permitting process. WiS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 144.445(3)(fm), 144.445(5) (West 1989).
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other "affected municipality" within 1,200 feet of the proposed fa-
cility227 must elect whether to participate in negotiations with the
developer.228 Those that do not elect to participate in the negotia-
tions waive their right to require the developer to obtain any local
permits or other approvals.229
If a municipality elects to negotiate, it must pass a "siting resolu-
tion" stating its intention to negotiate, and if necessary to arbitrate,
an agreement with the developer. 230 The governing body of the
municipality also must appoint members to the "local committee"
that will conduct the negotiations. 231  The host community may
appoint four members, no more than two of whom are elected offi-
cials or municipal employees; the host county may appoint two
members; and any other affected community may appoint one
member.232
The developer and the local committee may negotiate any sub-
ject except the need for the facility. However, they may not agree
to reduce any of the responsibilities the state imposes upon the
developer.233 The parties may agree to use a mediator to facilitate
negotiations; the mediator may not compel a settlement, how-
ever. 23  If the parties reach a settlement, the terms of the agree-
ment must be approved by the governing body of each host
municipality that has participated in the negotiations. 235 The re-
fusal of any governing body to accept the settlement renders the
settlement void.236
If the local committee and the developer cannot reach a settle-
ment, either or both of the parties may petition the Waste Facility
227. Communities that do not meet the 1200 feet definition may be added as a
party to the negotiations upon agreement of all other parties to the negotiation. Id.
§ 144.445(7n)(a).
228. Id. § 144.445(6).
229. Id. § 144.445(6)(f). A municipality may change its decision to negotiate by
rescinding its siting resolution. It then waives its right to apply any local permitting or
approval requirements to the developer. Id. § 144.445(6)(d).
230. Id. § 144.445(6)(a).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 144.445(7)(a).
233. Id. § 144.445(8)(a). If the parties disagree about whether a proposal concerns
a non-negotiable item, they may seek a determination of the Waste Facility Siting
Board ("Board"). Id. § 144.445(9)(b). If the parties negotiate any terms which affect
the developer's responsibilities under the plans submitted to the state in the state
licensing process, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) may review the
terms, rejecting any that would make the developer's obligations less stringent than
required under those plans. Id. § 144.445(9)(f).
234. Id. § 144.445(9)(c).
235. Id. § 144.445(9)0).
236. Id. § 144.445(9)(k).
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Siting Board ("the Board") to submit the matter to arbitration.237
The Board may order the parties to continue negotiating, or may
order the parties to submit their final offers for arbitration.238
Although the local committee and the developer may negotiate
over any subject except the need for the facility or the reduction of
the state-imposed responsibilities,239 the subjects that are arbitrable
are more limited.240 The arbitration award must adopt, without
modification, the final offer of either the local committee or the
developer.241
The Wisconsin siting statute has enjoyed moderate success. By
the end of 1993, siting agreements had been entered into for five
hazardous waste sites and forty-one solid waste sites.242 A study of
the twenty-one agreements reached before April 1987 revealed
that compensation to the municipalies included: start-up payments
of between $75,000 and $325,000; annual payments of between
$6,000 and $35,000; free or discounted waste disposal services; road
maintenance fees; reimbursement for costs of firefighting; reim-
bursement for lost revenues due to property tax exemptions; reim-
bursement of the municipality's cost of negotiating the agreement;
and funding of a local advisory or monitoring committee.243 Com-
pensation to individuals included start-up payments, property
237. Id. § 144.445(1O)(a) & (b).
238. Id. § 144.445(10)(d) & (f). The Board may delay arbitration until items re-
quired under the parallel state permitting track have been submitted. Id.
§ 144.445(10)(e). If the Board orders the parties to submit their final offers, the local
committee's final offer must be approved by each participating municipality's gov-
erning body before it is submitted. Id. § 144.445(10)(1). The final offer can include
only items the parties had offered in the prior negotiations. Id. § 144.445(10)(i).
239. Id. § 144.445(8)(a).
240. The issues that are arbitrable are: compensation to any person for substantial
economic impacts which are a direct result of the facility; reimbursement of reason-
able costs incurred by the local committee; screening and fencing related to the ap-
pearance but not the design of the facility; operational concerns such as noise, dust,
odors, and hours of operation (except matters of capacity); traffic flows; uses of the
site after the facility is closed; economically feasible methods to recycle or reduce the
quantities of waste to the facility; and the applicability of any local approval require-
ments. Id. § 144.445(8)(b).
241. Id. § 144.445(10)(p). If the Board fails to issue an arbitration award, the gov-
ernor must chose between the opposing final offers. Id.
242. Wisconsin Waste Facility Siting Board, Case Log (Dec. 20, 1993) (on file with
author); Wisconsin Waste Facility Siting Board, Settled Agreements (undated) (on file
with author). In addition to the settled agreements, three solid waste landfills were
the subject of arbitrations. Settled Agreements, supra. At least three proposals for
hazardous waste facilities, and 27 proposals for solid waste facilities are now being
negotiated. Case Log, supra.
243. Richard G. Schuff, Compensation in Negotiated Landfill Siting Agreements 5
(undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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value guarantees, testing of private wells and replacement of dam-
aged water supplies, and crop damage guarantees. 244 Almost half
of the agreements called for either no monetary compensation or
very modest compensation amounts.245
D. Solid Waste - Industry compensation programs
The solid waste industry also has turned to compensation in or-
der to secure community acceptance of undesirable land uses such
as solid waste landfills and incinerators.246 The programs have
been successful in the sense that few communities now accept such
facilities without bargaining for some form of compensation,247 and
some communities do accept LULUs that they almost certainly
would have rejected in the absence of compensation. 24  But the
compensated siting programs certainly have not been sufficiently
successful to have solved the "garbage crisis. '249
The best example of the limited success the compensated siting
programs have enjoyed is the "community partnership" program
instituted by Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI). In July 1990, BFI,
one of the nation's largest solid waste landfill operators, an-
nounced that it was launching a landfill and recyclery siting initia-
244. Id.
245. Id. at 4.
246. The hazardous waste industry also has used compensation to induce commu-
nity acceptance of facilities. For descriptions of successful compensation programs
other than those conducted under the auspices of the state hazardous waste siting
programs described in part III.C., supra, see Benjamin Walter & Malcolm Getz, So-
cial and Economic Effects of Toxic Waste Disposal, in CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY 223, 240-43 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1986).
247. Jeff Bailey, Some Big Waste Firms Pay Some Tiny Towns Little for Dump Sites,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at Al, A6.
248. See, e.g., Pamela A. D'Angelo, Waste Management Industry Turns to Indian
Reservations as States Close Landfills, 21 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1607 (Dec. 28,
1990) (reporting that the solid and hazardous waste industries had approached Native
American tribes with 20 different projects; 8 were rejected, 5 were under construction
at one time although 2 of those closed because of local opposition, and 5 were in the
process of negotiating contracts); Edythe Jenson, Maricopa Welcomes Landfill, ARIz.
REPUBLIC/PHOENiX GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1993, § Community Southeast, at 6-1 (landfill
welcomed after community was promised a large contribution to a road improvement
distict, $150,000 annually in host fees, substantial property tax payments, "lush road-
side landscaping" and public athletic fields); Edythe Jenson, Landfill Siting Panel
Wants to Start Over, ARIZ. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 17, 1993, § Chandler/
Gilbert Community, at 1 (contrasting rejection of proposed public regional landfill
with acceptance of Browning-Ferris landfill).
249. Michael Wiesskopf, Even Cash for Trash Fails to Slow Landfill Backlash Pub-
lic Resistance Widens U.S. Garbage Gap, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1992, at Al.
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tive in New York State.25 BFI promised the residents and
communities of New York that it would not even look for a site in a
community until the community had voted to host the landfill and
its officials had agreed to a package of "profit sharing" benefits.
Prior to the community partnership program, BFI had failed in
four different attempts to site a landfill through New York's con-
ventional siting procedures?25'
The company mailed a package of materials about the program
to virtually every community in New York. 52 By the spring of
1993, BFI reported that more than 90 communities had asked to
hear more about BFI's compensated siting program.253 Three com-
munities entertained proposals for a landfill. One small town,
Yorkshire, discussed a "partnership" package in which BFI prom-
ised the town 100 new jobs, $1.6 million in yearly fees, $100 million
in construction expenditures, and $1.15 million in yearly grants to
foster the town's long-term economic development.25 4  After re-
ceiving a petition in which 70% of the town's registered voters ex-
pressed opposition to the landfill, the town board voted
unanimously to reject the proposed landfill.255 A second commu-
nity, the town of Kingston, also turned, down the proposed land-
fill.25 6 A third community, Eagle initially voted to turn down the
proposal, but then petitioned BFI to resubmit the proposal.257
BFI's application for a permit is now pending before both the town
and the State, but it appears that the town is willing to host the
landfill.258
IV. Conclusion
Compensated siting programs are widespread. They form the
basis for much of the siting activity taking place under the
LLRWPA and NWPA. They are popular among states trying to
site hazardous waste and solid waste facilities, and among the solid
and hazardous waste industries.
250. BFI Partnership Plan Designed to Offer Economic Beneftis for Hosting Land-
fill Sites, Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 548 (July 27, 1990) [hereinafter BFI Partner-
ship Plan]; 1 COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP NEWS 1 (BFI New York Autumn 1990).
251. Wiesskopf, supra note 249.
252. BFI Partnership Plan, supra note 250.
253. 3 COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP NEWS 1 (BFI New York Spring 1993).
254. Wiesskopf, supra note 249.
255. Id.
256. Telephone Interview with Robert Raylman, Community Partnership Director,
BFI New York Community Partnership Program (Mar. 25, 1994).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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The programs are here to stay for the foreseeable future. No
compensated siting program has been a "success" in getting
LULUs sited. But neither has any other siting program. The expe-
rience so far suggests that while compensation may not be suffi-
cient to resolve siting impasses, it can't hurt, and indeed may be
one of several necessary elements of a solution. Until some pan-
acea for siting controversies comes along, the temptation to use
compensation to reduce opposition to siting proposals will be too
strong to resist without better evidence that it is ineffective or
counter-productive. Compensation programs therefore are likely
to be a significant feature of siting activities for some time.
Because the programs are here, and here to stay, the environ-
mental justice movement should be prepared to meet them head
on. It should begin to formulate a more thoughtful and compre-
hensive policy about compensated siting programs.
Several lines of questioning should be pursued. Initially, envi-
ronmental justice advocates should seek to articulate the circum-
stances under which compensation schemes are morally
objectionable, and why. There are at least four major moral ques-
tions that require further exploration. 259 First, because the siting of
noxious LULUs often involve risks to health and safety, the ques-
tion arises whether compensation schemes commodify, or subject
to the free market, matters that should not be bought and sold.2 °
Society has chosen not to allow people to sell their kidneys to the
highest bidder; should a similar judgment be made about whether
people can sell their freedom from the health risks posed by nearby
LULUs?
Second, it is likely that the communities that accept LULUs
under compensated siting programs will be our poorest communi-
ties, because those communities lack alternative sources of funds.
The distributional consequences of compensated siting programs
therefore raise fundamental questions about our treatment of the
poor and about the voluntariness of any site accepted by the
communities.261
259. For further discussion of the moral questions compensation programs raise,
see Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It?, supra note 2, at 1040-41, and sources
cited therein.
260. For discussions about whether certain rights should not be traded on the mar-
ket, see, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1389-90 (1984); Margaret J. Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903-37 (1987); Susan Rose-Acker-
man, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
261. ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 136-37.
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Third, compensated siting programs allow a community to trade
away the rights of future generations, who aren't represented at the
bargaining table. 62 That fact raises difficult questions about the
nature of our obligations to future generations.263
Finally, compensation schemes are likely to be considered im-
moral unless the community voluntarily enters into the siting
agreement.2 4 What are the essential elements of a voluntary
agreement? Is an agreement voluntary, for example, if communi-
ties are, relative to site developers, ignorant about the risks and
harms the facilities will impose?
None of these questions is susceptible to easy answers, and each
requires a great deal more thought by environmental justice advo-
cates. Once positions on those questions begin to emerge more
clearly, there are second generation issues - assuming that at least
some forms of compensation are moral in at least some circum-
stances, how do we structure compensation programs to be most
fair? Those issues include, for example, the question of how to en-
sure that communities and siting officials have relatively equal bar-
gaining power. Some states, such as Wisconsin, provide no money
for local communities to do their own health and safety analyses,
or even to hire their own consultants to review the industries' stud-
ies. Should such grants be required, and under what terms? Simi-
larly, communities are at a severe disadvantage in finding out
about what other communities have bargained for. The industry
sometimes imposes as a condition of the bargain that the commu-
nity not reveal the terms of the agreement.265 Even where commu-
nities are free to reveal the terms, there is no centralized
mechanism that allows communities to learn from each others' ex-
periences easily. At the same time, there has been little research
on how siting agreements have worked out in practice, so commu-
nities may find it hard to assess whether they should follow another
community's example, even if they can discover the terms that the
262. Id. at 98.
263. For general discussions of how the rights of future decisions might be taken
into account in siting decisions, see Guy Kirsch, Solidarity Between Generations: In-
tergenerational Distributional Problems in Environmental and Resource Policy, in Dis-
TRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL-RESOURCE POLICY 381 (Allan
Schnaiberg et al. eds., 1986); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The
Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46
VAND. L. REV. 267, 289-300 (1993); Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive
Waste Management: The National Experience, in EoUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT 24, 50-52 (Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983).
264. See ENGLISH supra note 2, at 136-37.
265. Bailey, supra note 247.
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other community was able to negotiate. 266 All of those issues re-
quire further attention.
Similarly, there are serious issues raised by the forms negotia-
tions take. In many compensated siting programs, the community
bargains through its elected officials, or through a committee ap-
pointed specifically for the bargaining. The community as a whole
may have the power to review the terms of the siting agreement
through a referendum. But none of the programs distinguishes be-
tween the interests of those who are most affected by the siting and
those who are least affected. A community could, therefore, agree
to accept a site in exchange for benefits that will advantage the
majority of the community, but do little or nothing for those who
live right next door to the facility. Should we reshape compensa-
tion programs to be more protective of those most affected, and if
so how? 2 6 7 The converse of that issue is the question of whether
people who are remotely affected by the siting should have the
right to veto an agreement accepted by a community. If the host
community accepts the facility, should the ski resort twenty miles
away be able to veto the site because they fear that it might stigma-
tize the area and thereby reduce tourism? Such questions of how
to identify who should have a say, and how to balance the rights of
the various interested parties are critical to the design of a com-
pensation program, but have received little attention.
The purpose of this article is to spur better thinking on those
issues. The questions are difficult, and proposed answers undoubt-
edly will spark a great deal of controversy within the environmen-
tal justice movement. But compensated siting programs will get
harder to change as time goes on, so there is value in joining the
debate at the ground floor.
266. Professor Kent E. Portney, Professor of Political Science at Tufts University,
and the TELLUS Institute, a non-profit research organization, currently are analyzing
host community agreements and studying how satisfied host communities are with the
implementation of the agreements. That research should prove very helpful to com-
munities negotiationg compensation agreements in the future. Telephone Interview
with James Goldstein, Associate Scientist, TELLUS Institute (May 6, 1994).
267. See Been, Neighbors Without Redress, supra note 2.
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